We examine the role of the inter-industry input-output network structure in the transfer of information among firms. We focus our attention on the role of industries that serve as 'hubs,' or central industries, in the flow of trade across industries. Consistent with a diversification effect, we find that firms in these central industries are more exposed to systemic risks compared to 
Introduction
The accounting literature has long recognized the role of information transfers among firms in forming beliefs about earnings and returns. In one of the early studies in this area, Clinch and Sinclair (1987) document intra-industry information transfers. More recent studies document information transfers via customer/supplier links (e.g., Pandit et al. 2011 ) and informativeness of individual firms' earnings guidance about market returns (e.g., Anilowski et al. 2007 ). We provide a specific explanation for why the strength of the information transfers varies among firms that have similar characteristics and similar positions in the value chain. In particular, we examine how the inter-industry network structure affects information transfers, and we show that the effect is economically important.
Our analysis views industries through the lens of the network formed by their reliance on each other for inputs or as customers. We place particular attention on 'central' industries that form hubs in the network. We measure an industry's centrality as the extent to which it has strong direct or indirect ties to a large fraction of the economy. In particular, we use an eigenvector measure of centrality that characterizes the network as a matrix, and captures both direct and indirect links between industries. The measure incorporates 'ripple effects' whereby an industry that serves few others may be central because those few that it serves have strong connections with the remaining industries. In other words, the measure captures not only direct customer and supplier relationships, but also higher-tier associations such as customers of customers and suppliers of suppliers.
Our first set of findings provides evidence that firms in central industries (hereafter central firms) obtain some diversification by virtue of their exposure to wide swaths of the economy. We estimate the R 2 s from capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and Fama-French three-factor model as a gauge of the extent to which systemic risk explains stock returns. We then regress these R 2 s on explanatory factors, including centrality of the industry the firm belongs to, firm size, analyst coverage, and trading volume. We find that central firms have higher R 2 s, consistent with a diversification effect.
We also examine earnings-response-coefficients (ERCs) to assess whether investors learn less from earnings surprises of central firms. If central firms track the overall economy more closely, investors can place less reliance on their firm-specific earnings information. Consistent with this, we find that central firms have lower ERCs than non-central firms. Prior studies have
shown that the stock price reaction to earnings announcements is greater for early announcing firms than for late announcing firms (Foster 1980 (Foster , 1981 . 1 We find that this effect is diminished for central firms. This is consistent with the central firms' low ERC being due to preemption by macroeconomic news rather than by other firms' earnings announcements.
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Our second set of analyses examines how centrality impacts information transfers. For each industry, we examine the association between its monthly returns and the concurrent and one-month-ahead returns of the industries adjacent to it. We find that this association is greater for central industries. Similarly, we find that, compared to non-central firms, central firms'
seasonally differenced quarterly return-on-assets (ROA) have a stronger association with adjacent firms' both concurrent and one-quarter-ahead ROA. In other words, shocks to central industries propagate more strongly than shocks to non-central industries. This is consistent with the central firms having some diversification that hedges their exposure to shocks to individual industries.
Our study relates to the literature on the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets. Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007) show that stock returns of industries that associate with macroeconomic fundamentals can predict market returns. Along the same lines, Anilowski et al. (2007) and Bonsall et al. (2012) find that 'bellwether' firms' earnings guidance predicts market-wide returns, where they identify bellwether firms based on size and past relation with market-wide returns, respectively. Our study adds to this literature by linking evidence of information transfers to a specific mechanism -inter-industry trade flows. Additionally, our study also complements prior work, such as Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011) , who study firm-specific customer and supplier relations to identify potential information transfers. Our study differs from these studies in two respects. First we examine the associations from a different dimension, namely from the industry perspective. For example if a firm has several customers, all of which are essentially from the same industry, the firm's performance may not associate with each of these individual customers' performance, whereas it will more strongly associate with the overall performance of its customers' industry . Second, unlike firm-specific data, which require some degree of a concentrated activity with a given customer or supplier, the BEA input/output tables incorporate all trade-flows. For example, a company may buy from or sell to a dispersed set of firms, none of which individually warrant mention as a major customer or supplier at the firm level. Our results suggest that prior findings on the cross predictability of returns across economically linked firms (Cohen and Frazzini 2008; Menzly and Ozbas 2010 and Pandit et al. 2011) are likely stronger among non-central firms because these firms have a less diversified set of input/output connections.
Our study is also related to the literature that examines the propagation of shocks throughout the economy. In a recent analytical study, Acemoglu et al. (2012) The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of centrality as well as our empirical predictions. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 provides evidence that systemic risk accounts for a relatively large portion of returns for firms in central industries.
Section 5 shows that stock market and accounting based performances of central firms provide greater information transfer than those of non-central firms. Section 6 concludes.
Centrality and Empirical Predictions

The Setting
In any economy, the structure of inter-industry interactions has an impact on the importance of an industry, and on the factors that affect that industry's performance. Some industries, such as retail trade or plastic production, have strong customer/supplier interactions with several other industries and therefore are in more central positions. Others, such as tobacco products manufacturing in the U.S., are relatively isolated.
To fix ideas, consider an economy with N industries where there is one central industry that makes equal sized trades with all other industries. For simplicity, assume that the other N-1 industries do not trade with each other, leading to the network structure shown in Figure 1 . In this economy, as N increases, a diversification argument based on the law of large numbers 3 As Lucas (1977) and others argue, in highly disaggregated economies, idiosyncratic shocks will remain fairly confined. While Dupor (1999) and Horvath (1998 Horvath ( , 2000 debate on whether sectoral shocks can transfer into aggregate fluctuations, Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide a more complete answer to this question by showing that sectoral shocks can lead to aggregate fluctuations only in the presence of asymmetries in the roles different sectors. Gabaix (2011) provide a similar model using firm-level shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations.
implies that idiosyncratic shocks to non-central industries will have only a negligible impact on the performance of the central industry. On the other hand, an idiosyncratic shock to the central industry will propagate to all non-central industries and affect their performance (Acemoglu et al. 2012 ). Because of these forces, systemic factors play a relatively larger role in determining central industries' performance, as compared to the individual performances of non-central industries.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
In this setting, the performance of an industry will be informative about the concurrent and/or future performance of the industries it is tied to. The predictive ability will depend on the rate at which shocks transfer from one industry to another. If shocks transfer instantaneously, then a shock to one industry cannot predict future shocks to another industry -it only pertains to concurrent shocks. Even if shocks propagate with a delay, the relation between non-central industry performance and central industry performance diminishes as the number of industries grows. This ultimately results in a central industry's performance predicting that of individual non-central industries, but not vice versa.
The setting described above leads to the following two main testable predictions. First, compared to the performance of the non-central industries, the performance of the central industries associates more strongly with systemic fluctuations and risks. An extension of this prediction is that investors will have better anticipated the earnings of central industries. The reasoning follows an analogy to Ayers and Freeman (1997) , who find evidence that investors better predict the industry component of earnings than the firm-specific component. Similarly, we expect that investors better predict the macroeconomic component of earnings than the industry-and firm-specific components. Second, current period shocks to the performance of a central industry are more strongly associated with the concurrent and/or future performance of the industries it is linked to, than shocks to a non-central industry are associated with the industries it is linked to.
Measure of Centrality
The economic story and predictions outlined in the previous section depend on the actual structure of the interactions in the economy. In this section we introduce our measure of centrality and take a closer look at the interactions in the U.S. economy. We measure centrality using the eigenvector centrality measure, which is formally defined by Bonacich (1972).
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Eigenvector centrality weights an industry's ties with other industries by the importance of the industries it is tied to. For example, industry i could be tied to industries x and y, both of which are not tied to any other industry, and industry j could be tied to q and z, both of which are tied to a few other industries. Ceteris paribus, industry j will have a higher eigenvector centrality than industry i because the industries it is tied to are more important in the network than those industry i is tied to. Formally, the eigenvector centrality for all nodes j ≠ i is calculated as follows:
where c i is the eigenvector centrality of industry i, M (i) is the set of all industries that are tied to i, λ is a constant and A ij is the weight of the edge between i and j. 5 The term eigenvector centrality arises because (1) can be written in matrix form as λ = Ac c, an eigenvalue equation.
The constant λ is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A, which the Perron-Frobenius theorem implies is the only one whose associated eigenvector c has all positive entries.
In calculation of (1) we define edge weight A ij as strength of the link between industries i 4 Variants of this measure are used in recent studies for similar purposes (see Hochberg, Ljunqvist and Lu 2007; Ahern and Harford 2010; Acemoglu et al. 2012) . 5 In the calculation of simple unweighted eigenvector centrality A ij is defined as an indicator variable that equals 1 if i is connected to j and zero otherwise. An industry is not treated as linked to itself (A ii = 0) when writing (1) in matrix form. and j to take into account that certain links between industries are stronger than others. We calculate the strength of the link between any given industry pair i and j using the following undirected measure: 
where s ij equals to the sales (in dollars) of goods and services by industry i to industry j. The first (second) ratio measures the sales made by i to j as a percentage of i's total sales (j's total purchases), gauging whether j is an important customer to i (i is an important supplier to j). The second two ratios similarly measure whether i is an important customer to j, and j is an important supplier to i, respectively. A smaller A ij indicates a weaker link between industries i and j accordingly we refer the reciprocal 1 / A ij as the distance between the two industries.
We construct the eigenvector centrality measure using detailed input-output tables published by the BEA every five years. Following Ahern and Harford (2010) and Anjos and Fracassi (2012), we use the 1997 "Use Table" for calculation of the centrality measure. We utilize 1997 data because 1997 is the approximate midpoint of our data period and according to Anjos and Fracassi (2012) the flows among industries remain highly persistent over years.
We define industries using the 4-digit IO industry codes provided by the BEA. We exclude government, special industries, value added and final users (industry definitions that start with the letters S, V, or F). 6 Figure 2 plots the actual network structure by depicting the connections between 123 industries. While the network in Figure 2 is far more complex than that in Figure 1 , we can conclude that the actual interactions in the U.S. economy resembles the 6 We do not include government/special industry/value added/final uses industries in the calculation of the strength measure because of the difficulties in the interpretation of certain associations. (e.g., negative sales values, changes in private inventories etc.) In the calculation of the strength measure, we include private consumption expenditures to calculate total sales numbers so that our measures gauge importance relative to overall sales, rather than strictly business-to-business sales.
economy depicted in Figure 1 , as some industries clearly play a more central role than others (Acemoglu et al. 2012) . In Table 1 , we provide a list of the most central industries.
(Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here) 3 Data and descriptive statistics
Data
We obtain accounting data and stock returns data from COMPUSTAT quarterly file and CRSP daily and monthly files respectively. Analyst-related data come from I/B/E/S/. The specific data requirements differ for returns related tests and earnings related tests and accordingly for each analysis we start with the sample of firms from COMPUSTAT and impose additional restrictions depending on the specification.
We require that the historical NAICS industry code be available in COMPUSTAT in order to merge our firm-related data with our centrality measures, available at the BEA 4-digit industry level. This restricts our sample period to the fiscal years after 1985, ending in 2011. We exclude regulated firms (NAICS 22) and financial institutions (NAICS 52) from the sample because their earnings and returns depend relatively more on the regulatory environment than for other firms in the economy. Figure 3 plots the centrality measure by decreasing order. The figure exhibits the common phenomenon that a small number of nodes in the network, industries in our case, exhibit high connectivity (e.g., Newman 2010). As the figure demonstrates, while most industries exhibit some connections with the other industries, there are relatively few 'hub'
Descriptive statistics
industries. Four industries -wholesale trade, construction, management of companies, and real estate -exhibit the highest degree of centrality, followed by a number of other industries with still relatively high eigenvector centrality. We confirm these observations in Table 2 four industries to be classified as central. 7 In particular, our analyses remain qualitatively similar when using a cutoff of 0.12, or 12% of the distribution of industries, and when using a cutoff of 0.10 or 21% of the industries.
4 Are central firms more exposed to systemic risk?
R-square regressions Research design
As we explain in section 2.2, our first prediction is that central firms are more exposed to systemic risks than non-central firms. In order to determine whether this prediction holds, we estimate the ability of CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models to explain central firms'
returns. We expect that the R 2 s from these models will be higher for central firms than for noncentral firms.
We estimate CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models with both daily and monthly returns data using non-overlapping five-year windows. 8 We restrict our sample to firms that are in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT. We require firms to have at least 800 days (60 months) of return data availability to be included in the daily (monthly) regressions. This helps us to limit the impact of stocks with limited return information during the estimation period.
Upon estimating the CAPM and the three-factor models we test the association between the R 2 s from these models and our centrality measure using the following model:
Eigenvector Centrality + Analysts Dummy
We predict that the coefficient on Eigenvector Centrality, β 1 , should be positive if central firms are more exposed to systemic risks than non-central firms. Because the R 2 s in the regressions could also depend on the information environment and the liquidity of the stocks traded, we add three control variables (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004, Kelly 2005) . 10 Analysts Dummy is equal 8 We use the following fiscal years as cutoffs for the estimation periods: 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Results are not dependent on inclusion or exclusion of the fiscal year 1985 (estimation period from 1981 to 1985) in the sample. 9 Our approach of using R 2 s as the dependent variable is parallel to that used in the study of stock return synchronicity (e.g., Morck et al. 2000 ; Piotroski and Roulstone 2004) . 10 For example, the market price of a stock will remain the same if the stock is not traded during a given period, to one if the stock is covered by the analysts at the end of the R 2 s estimation period, Average 
Results
We present our results from the estimation of (3) in Table 3 . The first two columns present the results using daily returns data. The coefficient on the Eigenvector Centrality is positive in both CAPM and Fama-French specifications at the 1% level or better. The effect is also economically important. For example, an increase of the centrality measure from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile, or 0.078, corresponds to a 0.90% increase in R 2 s in the CAPM specification using daily returns, compared to a sample average R 2 of 9.63%. Consistent with Piotroski and Roulstone's (2004) and Kelly (2005) 's findings our results indicate that firms covered by analysts, and firms with a higher market capitalization have higher R 2 s, indicating that larger firms are more exposed to systemic risks than other firms. Our analysis using monthly returns yields results that are similar to those using daily returns. For both CAPM and Fama-
French three factor models, we find that central firms have higher R 2 s. Overall these findings are consistent with our prediction that exposure to systemic risks increases with the centrality.
(Insert Table 3 about here) which would result in a low R 2 .
Earnings Response Coefficients Research design
In this section we examine whether investors react less to earnings announcements of central firms compared to non-central firms. Our prediction follows from our findings in the previous section that central firms are more exposed to systemic risks than non-central firms.
Given this association, we expect that investors can better anticipate the earnings of central industries because investors have access to a wide variety of sources of macroeconomic news that they can impound into prices throughout the quarter. Consequently, we predict that the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) of central firms should be lower than ERCs of non-central firms.
We conduct the following regression in order to investigate this hypothesis:
where CAR it is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i and quarter t, defined over a three-day window around the earnings announcement date reported by I/B/E/S/. We subtract the weighted market return to the company cumulative returns; Central i is an indicator variable equal to one when the centrality measure is above the cutoff level of 0.111; Surprise it is equal to the actual earnings per share less the most recent analysts' consensus earnings forecast, both scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the firm's fiscal quarter. We use the earnings per share and earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S/ and we require that there is a lag of at least 2 days between the most recent consensus forecast and the actual announcement date in order to avoid any information leakage concerns. Because we use analyst forecasts to calculate the surprise, our sample is restricted to firms that are covered by analysts. This tends to skew the sample towards larger companies. We also require that the company fiscal quarter ends either in March, June, September or December. This restriction is necessary because we also examine the impact of the timing of announcement relative to peer firms.
We also include a vector of control variables (X it ) that are identified as determinants of earnings response coefficients in prior research (see for example Francis and Ke, 2006 , Lim and Tan, 2008 and Aboody, Aobdia and Hughes, 2012 . X it includes the following: Tobinq, the Tobin Q coefficient defined as the market value of assets (i.e., total liabilities plus market value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter) divided by the book value of total assets; StdReturns, the 90 calendar day stock returns volatility ending three days prior to the earnings announcement date; Leverage, the firm book leverage (total debt over total debt plus book value of equity);
Logmkval, the natural logarithm of the firm fiscal quarter end market value; Loss, an indicator variable equal to one when the actual I/B/E/S/ EPS is negative; Specialitems, an indicator variable equal to one when special items during the quarter are above 5% of the total assets value;
Fourthquarter, an indicator variable equal to one when the fiscal quarter is the last one of the year.
We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. All control variables are interacted with the surprise in order to control for their impact on the ERCs. Because this interaction could create some issues with interpretation of the results on the coefficient on the surprise when the mean of the variables is not equal to zero, we normalize the mean of all continuous explanatory control variables to zero in order to present meaningful estimates of β 3 , the coefficient of interest. We predict that the coefficient β 3 will be negative if more information relevant to central firms is released outside earnings announcement date in comparison to noncentral firms.
Results
We present our results from the estimation of (4) in assets is also significantly lower than the proportion of non-central firms. All these differences are significant at the 1% level or better when using a t-test of differences for the mean or a
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test for the median. Overall, these results suggest that central firms are larger and more mature than non-central firms. This confirms the need to control for these differences in our specifications on the ERCs.
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(Insert Table 4 about here)
Column (1) of + Surprise × Late Announcer × Central remains negative and significant at 5% using an F-test of differences, indicating that the ERC of central firms that are late announcers is still lower than the ERC of central firms that are early announcers. The economic magnitude of the impact of centrality is magnified for early announcers in comparison to Column (1) and (2). In particular, the reduction in ERC for central firms represents almost 12% of the ERC of early announcing firms. In Column (4), we confirm that the results in Column (3) continue to hold when we cluster the standard errors at the quarter level. The results, except those of the F-tests, remain unchanged.
Are central firms' returns and ROA changes more informative than those of non-central firms?
In this section, we test our second prediction that the central industries' performance leads that of the non-central industries. In particular, we expect that the stock performance and the accounting performance of central firms are informative about those of non-central firms.
Returns Predictability Research design
Our analysis of the predictability of returns is similar to that in Hong, Torous and Valkanov (2007) . We test whether monthly return of an industry (hereafter source industry) has predictive power over the future returns of the industries that it is linked to (hereafter the linked industries) and whether the effects are enhanced when the source is a central industry. In particular, we regress the weighted average returns of the linked industries for the month n+1 on the returns of the source industry for month n. The linked industries are defined as the industries that are linked to the source industry either as a supplier or a customer or both. We conduct the following regression: Returns is the market capitalization value weighted average monthly return of the source industry less the value weighted NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX market return; Central is an indicator variable that equals one if the centrality of the industry is greater than 0.111 and zero otherwise.
X is a vector of control variables defined as in Hong et al. (2007) and includes the following variables: Spread, the default spread (DSPR), defined as the difference between the Moody's BAA-rated and AAA-rated bond yields; Inflation, the seasonally adjusted monthly inflation, measured as the growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI); Dividend rate, the one year market dividend yield, computed as the total dividend from the CRSP market portfolio divided by the current market level.
We predict a positive coefficient on the interaction term, Source Abn Returns × Central, 
Results
We present our results from the estimation of (5) in Table 5 . We start our analysis by examining the concurrent associations. In particular, in Panel A we regress current returns of the linked industries on the concurrent returns of the source industry in Panel A. In Column (1), we regress current period linked industries abnormal returns on the control variables. We find that higher spreads between AAA and BAA bonds, higher inflation rates, lower standard deviation of market returns and lower dividend rates are positively associated with concurrent abnormal returns. In Column (2), we add the returns of the source industries and their interactions with the central dummy. We find that source returns are positively associated with linked returns. The association is enhanced when the source is a more central industry, evidenced by a positive coefficient on the interaction Source Abn Returns × Central. In particular, the coefficient in the regression goes from 0.098 for non-central sources to 0.213 for central sources, or a 117%
increase. The R 2 s in the specification go from 0.03 in Column (1) to 0.13 in Column (2), indicating that the returns of the source and their interaction with the central dummy have strong incremental explanatory power in the regression. Results are unchanged when clustering the standard errors at the year level in Column (3). Overall, these results are consistent with central source firms having a stronger association with linked firms than non-central source firms.
(Insert Table 5 The total coefficient on Source Abn Returns goes from 0.008 for non-central firms to 0.020 for central firms, a 120% difference comparable to the increase in coefficient for concurrent returns.
Results in Column (2) are unchanged in Column (3) when standard errors are clustered at the year level.
Earnings Predictability Research design
Our final analysis investigates whether current accounting performance of a source industry can explain the future accounting performance of the linked industries, and whether the effects are enhanced when the source is a central industry. In particular, we regress the weighted seasonally differenced return on assets (i.e. current quarter return on assets minus four quarter lagged return on assets) of the linked industries for the next quarter on the seasonally differenced return on assets of the source industry for current quarter. We conduct the following regression: In order to compute Linked ROA Change at quarter n we first compute the seasonally differenced return on assets (ROA) for each company in each industry. ROA is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (ibq in COMPUSTAT) divided by the total assets at the end of the prior quarter. We then weight these ROA changes by the market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter of each firm within the industry in order to obtain industry averages of ROA changes. We then weight these ROA changes by the strength of the link between the source industry and the linked industries in order to compute a linked industries average ROA change, or Linked ROA Change. Similar to our analysis on returns, we anticipate that industries with stronger links predict each other's accounting performance better than industries with weaker links and we consequently use the strength of the links between industries as the weight for our analyses.
Similar to our definition of Linked ROA Change, we define Source ROA Change as the market capitalization weighted seasonally differenced ROA of the firms comprising the source industry. We predict that the coefficient on β 1 is positive if source industries' changes in ROA explain future changes in ROA for linked industries. We also predict that the coefficient on β 3 is positive if the explanatory power is greater for central industries. We include lagged values of Linked ROA Change in order to control for future predictability of within industry earnings changes, following Bernard and Thomas (1990) 's findings at the firm level. In particular, we predict that β 4 , β 5 and β 6 should be positive while β 7 should be negative, due to positive autocorrelation of earnings for the prior 3 quarters and negative autocorrelation of earnings for the prior 4 th quarter, as in Bernard and Thomas (1990) .
Similar to the analysis on ERCs, and for the purpose of consistency in our regressions, we restrict our sample to firms having fiscal quarters ending in March, June, September and December.
Results
We present our results from the estimation of (6) in Table 6 . Similar to Table 5 , the results in Panel A present specification using concurrent earnings change as the dependent variable. Column (1) presents specifications using the control variables only. Consistent with Bernard and Thomas (1990), we find that the first three lags of the Linked Change ROA variable are positively associated with the current value of this variable and two of the three associations are significant. Also consistent with Bernard and Thomas (1990) the coefficient on the fourth lag of Linked Change ROA is negative and significant.
We add Source Change ROA in Column (2), as well as its interaction with the Central dummy variable. We find a significant positive association between Source and Linked concurrent year on year changes in ROA, evidenced by a positive coefficient on Source Change ROA. We also find that this positive association is significantly enhanced when the source industry is central. In particular, the coefficient nearly triples from 0.039 to 0.114. In Column (3) we add source fixed effects into the analysis and confirm our findings in Column (2). The coefficients of interest remain significantly positive and are practically unchanged compared to the specifications in Column (2).
(Insert Table 6 Central remain positive and significant at the 1% level and are practically unchanged.
Conclusion
We investigate the role of inter-industry trade flows as a source of information transfers among firms. We hypothesize that an industry's position in the inter-industry network is an important determinant of that industry's exposure to systemic shocks and the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks to that industry affects the industries it is linked to. In particular, building on a diversification based argument and prior theoretical findings on the propagation of industry shocks, we predict and find that firms in central industries are more exposed to systemic risks compared to firms in non-central industries. Additionally, we find that the earnings response coefficients are lower for central firms, which is consistent with the investors' ability to better anticipate the earnings of central industries based on macroeconomic information.
We also document that shocks to a central industry's performance, as measured by stock returns and accounting earnings, propagate more strongly than shocks to a non-central industry's performance. In particular, we find that a central industry's performance is more strongly associated with the concurrent and future performance of the industries it is linked to, than the performance of a non-central industry is associated with the industries it is linked to.
Our study adds to the literature on the gradual diffusion of information across asset markets by identifying a specific channel -intra-industry trade flows -through which information transfers occur. Prior research examines the cross predictability of returns across economically linked firms, and our findings suggest that such associations are stronger among non-central firms because these firms have a less diversified set of input/output connections. Our paper also contributes to the literature on the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in the economy.
Consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2012)'s prediction that central industries play a key role in
amplification of idiosyncratic shocks into aggregate shocks, our empirical evidence indicates that the shocks to central industries propagate stronger than those to non-central industries.
Appendix A. Variable Descriptions Variable Description Analysts dummy
An indicator variable that equals one if there is a quarterly consensus EPS forecast provided in I/B/E/S/ for the last quarter of the analysis period and zero otherwise. Average proportion traded Average number of shares traded as a percentage of shares outstanding. The variable is calculated using daily (monthly) data from CRSP for daily (monthly) analysis. CAR Cumulative returns for a given firm's stock for the three days around the earnings announcement date, less the value weighted NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX market return. Central An indicator variable that equals one if the centrality of the industry is greater than 0.111 and zero otherwise. Dividend rate Total dividend from the CRSP market portfolio divided by the current market level. Eigenvector Centrality
The value of eigenvector centrality. The calculation is described in detail in Section 2.2. The measure is computed based on the 1997 BEA "Use Tables" .  Fourthquarter An indicator variable that equals one for the fourth fiscal quarter and zero otherwise. Inflation
Monthly change in the seasonally adjusted consumer price index Late Announcer
An indicator variable that equals one when the earnings announcement date occurs after the median earnings announcement date during the quarter Leverage Total debt (short term plus long term) divided by itself plus book value of equity Logmkval Logarithm of the market capitalization of the company at the end of the period (shares outstanding x Price at the end of the fiscal quarter). Loss An indicator variable that equals one if the actual EPS as reported in I/B/E/S/ is negative and zero otherwise.
Source Abn Returns
Market capitalization weighted average monthly returns of the firms in the source industry Source ROA Change Market capitalization weighted average of the change in ROA between quarter n and quarter n-4 of firms in the industry. ROA is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by assets at the beginning of the quarter.
Specialitems
An indicator variable that equals one if the proportion of special items during the quarter exceeds 5% of the value of total assets. Spread
The difference between the yield of BAA rated and AAA rated bonds StdReturns Standard deviation of stock returns estimated over a 90 days period ending three days prior to the earnings announcement date Surprise Actual EPS less the most recent analyst consensus forecast, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. Actual and consensus are from I/B/E/S/. The consensus is measured at least two days prior to the earnings announcement date Linked Abn Returns Weighted average of the monthly industry returns less the value weighted market return. The weights are the strength of the link between the source and the linked industries and the monthly industry returns are weighted using market capitalization at the beginning of the month Linked ROA Change Weighted average of the industry year on year changes in ROA. Weights used are the strength of the link between source and linked firms. Industry level changes in ROA are computed as the market capitalization weighted average of the firm level change in ROA between quarter n and quarter n-4 Tobinq Book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter divided by the book value of total assets This table presents the analysis of the association between centrality and exposure to systemic risk using an ordinary least squares model. The dependent variable is the R 2 from CAPM or Fama French three factor models estimated using daily or monthly data. Estimations are conducted using five-year non-overlapping windows, ending in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 . The variable of interest is the centrality measure, Eigenvector Centrality. The definitions of the variables are available in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at a two sided 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Daily R-squares
Monthly R-squares This table presents the analysis of the association between centrality and the predictability of accounting performance at the industry level. The dependent variable is equal to the weighted average seasonally differenced quarterly return on assets of the linked industries of a given industry i (i.e., the source industry) The seasonally differenced quarter ROA of the linked industries is computed as the weighted average of each industry's average ROA change comprising the linked industries. The weights are based on the distance between the source and the linked industry. Each industry's average ROA is computed as the market value weighted average of the ROA changes of the firms comprising the industry. Panel A presents results for the concurrent association between the ROA of the linked industries and the source and Panel B presents the results where the dependent variable is one quarter ahead ROA of the linked industries. The definitions of the variables are available in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote significance at a two sided 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
